Where can I get Ashawo in Ibadan Oyo

TE Bvwg knowledge 2020/10/27 I409 2165851-1


Reasons for the decision:

I. Procedure

The complainant entered the federal territory bypassing the border controls and applied for international protection on October 19, 2015.

In the context of his initial survey by organs of the public security service, which took place the following day, he stated the following under the heading "Reason for escape":

“My father was an important figure in court in another region in Nigeria. He was killed five years ago when he announced his resignation. My brother was supposed to take over my father's office but refused. That was why my brother was murdered by members of this court. This organization is a secret society. Since I am next in order, I fled because I am afraid for my life. "

On July 10, 2017, the complainant was questioned in writing by the authority concerned. When asked about his reasons for fleeing, he stated the following:

"Q (Note: Question): Why are you applying for asylum in Austria?

A (Note: Answer): Because I want to stay legally in Austria. Otherwise I'll be checked by the police on the street and I'll have a problem. The Ogboni killed my father and brother and are after me too.

Q: Do you have any other reasons to flee?

On a. My life is in danger, they want to kill me.

Q: When were your father and brother killed?

A: My father was killed in 2010 and my brother in 2015.

Q: Why were the two killed?

A: My father was the chief of the Ogboni in my area. He wanted to terminate his membership. Since he swore sacred oaths, he was not allowed to leave the company. That's why you killed him. He quit twice before he was killed. After the first time he got very sick, then he went back to society. After the second dismissal, he died. After my father passed away, my brother was supposed to take the position. He refused and was killed after a while. He was a strict Catholic and died in 2015. After his death, I was supposed to take over the position. I can't because this oath is deadly, they sacrifice people. "

With the contested decision of July 12, 2017, the authority in question rejected the complainant's application for international protection with regard to the granting of the status of person entitled to asylum "in accordance with Section 3 Paragraph 1 in conjunction with Section 2 Paragraph 1 Item 13 AsylG 2005, Federal Law Gazette I No. 100 / 2005 (AsylG) as amended ”(ruling point I) as well as with regard to the status of beneficiary of subsidiary protection“ according to § 8 paragraph 1 in conjunction with § 2 paragraph 1 number 13 AsylG ”(ruling point II) as unfounded. At the same time, he was not granted a residence permit for reasons worthy of consideration "in accordance with Section 57 AsylG". "According to § 10 paragraph 1 number 3 AsylG in conjunction with § 9 BFA-procedural law, BGBl. I No. 87/2012 (BFA-VG) as amended" a return decision was made against the complainant "according to § 52 paragraph 2 number 2 Aliens Police Act 2005, BGBl. I No. 100/2005 (FPG) as amended ”and stated“ in accordance with Section 52 (9) FPG ”that his deportation to Nigeria is permissible“ in accordance with Section 46 FPG ”(point III). "According to § 55 paragraph 1a FPG" it was determined that there is no deadline for a voluntary departure (point IV), and a complaint against this decision "according to § 18 paragraph 1 point 5 BFA-VG" revoked the suspensive effect (point V) .

On July 25, 2017, the complainant filed the appeal against the contested decision with the Federal Administrative Court.

II. The Federal Administrative Court has considered:

Regarding A) Decision on the complaint against the contested decision

A) 1. Findings

The statements made under point I. are established as facts. In addition, the following additional findings are made:

A) 1.1. Regarding the findings on the person of the complainant:

The adult applicant is single, a citizen of Nigeria, a member of the Igbo ethnic group and professes the Christian faith. His identity is not certain.

He is healthy and able to work.

The applicant comes from Ibadan, Oyo State, where he lived until he left the country. He attended school in his country of origin for eleven years and made a living as a clothing dealer. The applicant's mother and four sisters still live in Ibadan and he is in regular contact with his mother. He also has two illegitimate underage daughters who live with the child's mother in Ibadan.

He has been in Germany since October 19, 2015. In Austria he has no family ties and does not live in any relationship or cohabitation.

From November 2016 to April 2017 and from November 2018 to April 2019 he worked on a daily basis as a part-time worker for a municipality. However, he is not able to support himself and earns his livelihood from the state basic welfare.

He speaks German at A2 level and does voluntary work in a social market. He has also made various acquaintances in Austria.

He is criminally harmless.

With regard to the applicant's allegations of flight, and given the general situation in the country, it is not determined that he would be persecuted in Nigeria on the basis of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. If the complainant returns to Nigeria, there is a significant probability that he will not face any asylum-related persecution or any existential threat whatsoever.

A) 1.2. Regarding the findings on the situation in Nigeria:

The following statements are made regarding the situation in Nigeria:

"Political situation

Nigeria is divided into 36 federal states (ÖB 10.2019; see AA 16.1.2020; GIZ 3.2020a) with a total of 774 LGAs / districts (GIZ 3.2020a; see AA 16.1.2020). Each of the 36 federal states is led by a government under the leadership of a directly elected governor (State Governor) and a state parliament (State House of Assembly) (GIZ 3.2020a; see AA 16.1.2020). The police and the judiciary are controlled by the federal government (AA January 16, 2020).

Nigeria is a Federal Republic with a strong executive president (presidential system based on the US model) (AA 24.5.2019a). Nigeria has a multi-party system. The constitution, which is based on the US system, contains all the attributes of a democratic constitutional state (including a catalog of basic rights, separation of powers). The strong president - at the same time commander in chief of the armed forces - and the vice-president face a parliament consisting of a senate and a house of representatives and an independent judiciary. Constitutional reality is dominated by the executive in the form of the directly elected president and the directly elected governors. The fight for political office is fought with great intensity, often with undemocratic, violent means. The judiciary is exposed to the influence of the executive and legislative branches as well as individual political leaders (AA January 16, 2020).

Party affiliation is mostly based on leaders, ethnic affiliation and, above all, strategic aspects. Parties are primarily seen as alliances of convenience to gain power. Political leaders switch parties when they see better chances of success elsewhere. Accordingly, none of the parties represents a clear political direction (AA January 16, 2020). Elected officials generally implement the policies they have made. However, their ability to do so is hampered by factors such as corruption, party political conflict, poor control over areas of the country where militant groups are active, and the President's undisclosed health problems (FH 1.2019).

In the presidential elections on February 23, 2019, incumbent Muhammadu Buhari was confirmed in office (GIZ 3.2020a). It received 15.1 million votes and was victorious in 19 states, mainly in the north and southwest of the country. His challenger, Atiku Abubakar, received 11.3 million votes and won in 17 states in the Southeast, in the Middle Belt and in the capital Abuja (GIZ 3.2020a; see BBC February 26, 2019). The voter turnout, at 36 percent, was significantly lower than in 2015. The elections were overshadowed by violent incidents with at least 53 dead. Election observers and representatives of civil society also criticized the lack of organization in the conduct of the elections, the intimidation of voters and the destruction of election documents in some parts of the country (GIZ 3.2020a). The opposition spoke of election manipulation. Abubakar is challenging the outcome in the Supreme Court because of irregularities. The chances that the complaint will be successful are slim (GIZ 3.2020a).

The National Assembly consists of two chambers: the Senate with 109 members and the House of Representatives with 360 members (AA 24.5.2019b). The governing party “All Progressives‘ Congress ”(APC) emerged victorious from the last elections to the National Assembly in February 2019. It was able to increase its majority in both chambers of the National Assembly. The largest opposition party, the "People’s Democratic Party" (PDP) had the president from 1999-2015. In 2015 she had to join the opposition for the first time and has since been weakened by disputes over the party leadership (AA January 16, 2020).

At the sub-national level, the APC governs 20 of the 36 federal states (AA January 16, 2020). On March 9, 2019, elections were held for regional parliaments and governors in 29 states. In the remaining seven states, the gubernatorial elections had already taken place in the months before. Here, too, there were irregularities and violent excesses (GIZ 3.2020a). Candidates from President Buhari's APC were able to win 17 governor posts, those of the opposition PDP 14 (Stears April 9, 2020). Regional elections have a major impact on Nigerian politics, as the governors control the finances of the states and are responsible for key sectors such as health and education (DW 11.3.2019).

In addition to modern state power, traditional leaders still have an influence that should not be underestimated, albeit largely informal. They are considered a communication center and moral authority and can be important mediators in communal and religious conflicts. This influence is increasingly being questioned by the younger generation (AA May 24, 2019a).

Swell:

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (January 16, 2020): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as of September 2019)

- AA - Foreign Office (May 24, 2019a): Nigeria - domestic policy, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Nigeria/innenpolitik_node.html, accessed January 31, 2020

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (May 24, 2019b): Nigeria - Overview, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/nigeria-node/nigeria/205786, accessed April 9, 2020

- BBC News (February 26, 2019): Nigeria Presidential Elections Results 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-f0b25208-4a1d-4068-a204-940cbe88d1d3, accessed April 12, 2019

- DW - Deutsche Welle (March 11, 2019): EU: Nigerian state elections marred by 'systemic failings', https://www.dw.com/en/eu-nigerian-state-elections-marred-by-systemic-failings / a-47858131, accessed April 9, 2020

- FH - Freedom House (1.2019): Freedom in the World 2018 - Nigeria, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/nigeria, accessed March 20, 2019

- GIZ - German Society for International Cooperation (3.2020a): Nigeria - Geschichte und Staat, http://liportal.giz.de/nigeria/geschichte-staat.html, accessed April 9, 2020

- ÖB - Austrian Embassy Abuja (10.2019): Asylum Country Report Nigeria

- Stears News (April 9th, 2020): Governorship Election Results, https://nigeriaelections.stearsng.com/governor/2019, accessed on April 9th, 2020

Security situation

There are no classic civil war areas or parties in Nigeria (AA January 16, 2020). Essentially, several sources of conflict can be distinguished: that of Boko Haram in the northeast; that between shepherds and peasants in the Middle Belt; as well as tensions in the Niger Delta (AA January 16, 2020; see EASO 11.2018a) and escalating violence in the state of Zamfara (EASO 11.2018a). In addition, there are tensions in the southeast between the government and Igbo groups that advocate an independent Biafra (EASO 11.2018a; see AA 16.1.2020), as well as between the army and the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) (EASO 11.2018a) . The conflict in the northeast is a cross-border jihadist insurgency. In the “middle belt” there are violent clashes between shepherds and farmers over dwindling resources. The clashes in the Niger Delta involve both conflicts between regional militant groups on the one hand and state power on the other, as well as rivalries between different local communities. In the southeast, there are (still) comparatively limited conflicts between individual secessionist movements and state power. However, the situation in the south-east of the country (“Biafra”) remains latently prone to conflict. However, IPOB is currently not very active in Nigeria (AA January 16, 2020).

In Nigeria, unpredictable local conflicts can break out in all regions. The causes and causes of the conflicts are mostly political, economic, religious or ethnic. In particular, the states of Zamfara, western Taraba and the eastern part of Nassarawa, northern Sokoto and the states of Plateau, Kaduna, Benue, Niger and Kebbi are currently from armed conflicts or intra-ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, violent conflicts between nomadic ranchers and sedentary farmers as well as well-organized gangs determine the security situation again and again. Demonstrations and protests are particularly possible in Abuja and Lagos, but also in other large cities and can lead to violent clashes. In July / August 2019, these caused repeated deaths in Abuja (AA April 16, 2020).

The German Foreign Office warns against traveling by land to the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Unnecessary travel to the rest of northern Nigeria, to the states of Sokoto, Katsina and Jigawa, is not recommended. We do not recommend traveling to the following states unless they lead directly to the respective capitals by air: in central and northern Nigeria Kaduna, Zamfara, Kano and Taraba, in southern Nigeria: Ogun, Ondo, Ekiti, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Imo, Anambra, Enugu, Abia, Ebonyi and Akwa Ibom. We also advise against traveling to the offshore coastal waters, the Gulf of Guinea, the Niger Delta, the Bay of Benin and the Bay of Bonny (AA April 16, 2020).

Terrorist acts of violence, such as attacks and explosive attacks by militant groups on security forces, markets, schools, churches and mosques, are constantly being carried out in the north-eastern parts of the country (AA April 16, 2020). The British Foreign Office warns against travel to Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and Gombe, as well as travel to the riverside regions of the states of Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom and Cross River in the Niger Delta, as well as travel to Zamfara closer than 20 km to the border Niger. We also advise against all unnecessary trips to the states of Bauchi, Zamfara, Kano, Kaduna, Jigawa, Katsina, Kogi, Abia, in the 20 km border strip to Niger in the states of Sokoto and Kebbi, areas of the Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers that are not riverside , and travel in the state of Niger within a radius of 20 km from the border with the states of Kaduna and Zamfara, west of the Kaduna River (UKFCO April 15, 2020). Violent crime is a serious problem in certain areas of Nigeria, as is the drug and weapon trafficking (FH 1.2019).

In the period from April 2019 to April 2020, the following Nigerian states stand out with a high number of deaths from acts of violence: Borno (2,712), Zamfara (685), Kaduna (589) and Katsina (392). The following states stand out with a low number: Gombe (3), Kebbi (3), Kano (7), Jigawa (7), Kwara (8), Enugu (8) and Ekiti (9) (CFR 2019).

Swell:

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (January 16, 2020): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as of September 2019)

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (April 16, 2020): Nigeria: Travel and security information (partial travel warning), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/nigeria-node/nigeriasicherheit/205788#content_5, April 16 .2020

- CFR - Council on Foreign Relations (2019): Nigeria Security Tracker, https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483, accessed April 12, 2019

- EASO - European Asylum Support Office (11.2018a): Country of Origin Information Report - Nigeria - Security Situation, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2001366/2018_EASO_COI_Nigeria_SecuritySituation.pdf, accessed April 16, 2020

- FH - Freedom House (1.2019): Freedom in the World 2019, Nigeria, https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2019, accessed April 17, 2020

- UKFCO - United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office (April 15, 2020): Foreign Travel Advice - Nigeria, https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/nigeria, accessed April 16, 2020

Niger Delta

In the Niger Delta, the main area of ​​oil production, there are numerous armed groups which, in addition to attacks on oil and gas pipelines, have also specialized in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and kidnappings with ransom extortion (ÖB 10.2019).

From 2000 to 2010, militant groups were active in the Niger Delta, claiming to defend the rights of the people living in the delta and to enforce the demands for participation in oil revenues by means of violence (sabotage of the oil infrastructure). In 2009, then President Yar'Adua succeeded in calming the conflict with an offer of amnesty. Under Buhari, the program ended on December 15, 2015. The attacks against the oil infrastructure were resumed (AA January 16, 2020; see ACCORD April 17, 2020). In autumn 2016, a new ceasefire was agreed with the armed groups, which has largely been observed so far (ÖB 10.2019). The amnesty program has been extended until 2019. Even if dialogue processes between the government and Delta interest groups are ongoing and a “ceasefire” is currently in place, at least in principle, the government does not seem to be really interested in mediation, but rather to “buy” the reluctance of the insurgents and to take military action in an emergency (AA January 16, 2020).

The situation remains very fragile, however, as there is still hardly any noticeable sustainable improvement for the population (AA January 16, 2020). Attacks on oil facilities continue to pose a threat to stability and oil production (ACCORD April 17, 2020). The conflict affects the states of the Niger Delta, including Abia, Akwa, Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers (EASO 2.2019).

The military is also in charge of the Civilian Joint Task Force, which is used against militant groups in the Niger Delta, among other things. Even if they act quite effectively in places, this group often commits human rights violations itself or arbitrarily denounces personal enemies to the security organs (AA January 16, 2020).

The clashes in the Niger Delta were both a conflict between regional militant groups on the one hand and state authorities on the other, as well as rivalries between different local communities. In the first case, the particular financial interests of the armed groups are in the foreground, in the second case it is about a distribution struggle between rival groups (AA 16.1.2020).

Kidnappings are particularly common in the Niger Delta and in the southeastern states of Abia, Imo and Anambra (FH 1.2019), so civilians were kidnapped in 2019 in order to receive ransom money (USDOS 03/11/2020; see ACCORD 04/17/2020).

Swell:

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (January 16, 2020): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as of September 2019)

- ACCORD - Austrian Center for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (April 17, 2020): ecoi.net topic dossier on Nigeria: Security Situation, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2028159.html, accessed April 17 .2020

- EASO - European Asylum Support Office (2.2019): Country Guidance: Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2004112/Country_Guidance_Nigeria_2019.pdf, accessed April 17, 2020

- FH - Freedom House (1.2019): Freedom in the World 2019, Nigeria, https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2019, accessed April 17, 2020

- ÖB - Austrian Embassy Abuja (10.2019): Asylum Country Report Nigeria

- USDOS - U.S. Department of State (March 11, 2020): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2026341.html, accessed April 9, 2020

Middle belt including Jos / plateau

For decades there has been religiously motivated violence in Nigeria - mainly in the Middle Belt - between local Christian farmers and nomadic Muslim cattle herders (USCIRF 4.2019; cf. EASO 2.2019). Originally a conflict over natural resources such as water and land, the conflict has increasingly acquired an ethno-religious dimension (EASO 2.2019). The conflict is becoming more and more ideological and intensifies the antagonism between Christians and Muslims or different ethnic groups (AA January 16, 2020). Polarization takes place on the basis of religious lines, since attacks are often perceived as religiously motivated. Both sides do not feel adequately protected by the security forces, and attackers go unpunished. There are also reports of ethnic cleansing in the context of the conflict (USCIRF 04/2019).

In central Nigeria, conflicts between shepherds and farmers over land and resources are intensifying. In individual cases, these clashes resulted in several hundred deaths. The conflict is increasing due to the ongoing desertification in northern Nigeria, population growth and the tense economic situation (AA May 24, 2019a).

In 2018, rural violence escalated and urban violent conflicts continued. Religiously motivated violence resulted in mass displacement, property destruction and the death of thousands of people (USCIRF 04/2019). In 2018, a total of 1,949 people were killed in the Middle Belt as a result of the conflict (FH 1.2019). In armed clashes between farmers and herdsmen over increasingly scarce resources, at least 96 people were killed in 2019 (AI April 8, 2020). Numerous states in Nigeria were affected by the violence, but in particular Adamawa, Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa and Benue (EASO 2.2019; see USCIRF 4.2019).

Swell:

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (January 16, 2020): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as of September 2019)

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (May 24, 2019a): Nigeria: Innenpolitik, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/nigeria-node/innenpolitik/205844, accessed April 17, 2020

- AI - Amnesty International (April 8, 2020): Amnesty Report, Nigeria, 2019, https://www.amnesty.de/informieren/amnesty-report/nigeria-nigeria-2019#section-11669032, accessed April 16, 2020

- EASO - European Asylum Support Office (2.2019): Country Guidance: Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2004112/Country_Guidance_Nigeria_2019.pdf, accessed April 17, 2020

- FH - Freedom House (1.2019): Freedom in the World 2019, Nigeria, https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2019, accessed April 17, 2020

- USCIRF - US Commission on International Religious Freedom (4.2019): United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2019: Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2008195/Tier1_NIGERIA_2019.pdf, accessed April 17, 2020

Northern Nigeria - Boko Haram

Boko Haram has been responsible for numerous serious attacks with thousands of deaths since mid-2010 (AA May 24, 2019a). In August 2016, Boko Haram split as a result of a leadership dispute in Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) (EASO 11.2018a).

According to various independent estimates, between 20,000 and 30,000 people fell victim to the conflict (AA May 24, 2019a; cf. HRW January 14, 2020; EASO 11.2018a). Boko Haram militias and the growing influence of ISIS-WA continue to terrorize the civilian population through murder, robbery, forced marriages, rape and human trafficking (AA January 16, 2020).

These groups continue to be responsible for killings, bombings and attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Nigeria (USDOS 11/1/2019).

Since President Buhari was sworn in in May 2015, more effective measures have been taken against the insurgents (ACCORD April 17, 2020). The states affected by Boko Haram (especially Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria) agreed in February 2015 to set up a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of around 10,000 men to jointly combat Boko Haram (AU-EU undated). In recent years, the military campaign against the Islamists has been intensified under pressure and with the participation of neighboring states and, according to President Buhari, has led to a "technical victory" claimed by the government (ÖB 10.2019). In fact, the Nigerian military and troops from neighboring countries Chad, Niger and Cameroon succeeded in ousting Boko Haram from some areas (GIZ 3.2020). After retreating into impassable terrain and the oath of allegiance of a splinter group to the so-called Islamic State, Boko Haram has now returned to the original guerrilla tactics of raids on remote villages and suicide attacks, often also by female assassins (ÖB 10.2019; cf. ACCORD 17.4.2020).

Some areas are still under the control of the various factions in the group. JAS appears to be most active in the northeast towards Cameroon, while ISIS-WA operates mainly near the border with Niger (EASO 2.2019). Boko Haram controls some villages near Lake Chad (ICG May 16, 2019). In 2019, Boko Haram and ISIS-WA launched attacks on population centers and security forces in Borno state. Boko Haram also carried out limited attacks in Adamawa state, while ISIS-WA attacked targets in Yobe state. Boko Haram no longer controls as much territory as before, but it is still possible for both groups in the northeast of the country to carry out attacks on military and civilian targets (ACCORD April 17, 2020; see USDOS March 11, 2020). In the north-east, after a temporary improvement (2015-2017), the security situation has deteriorated again since 2018. The Nigerian armed forces are unable to secure and hold rural areas and are limited to defending a few urban centers in the state of Borno (AA 1/16/2020).

In 2019 alone, around 640 civilians were killed in fighting between security forces and Boko Haram. The group also kidnapped at least 16 people (HRW January 14, 2020). According to another source, at least 378 civilians were killed in at least 31 armed attacks by the Boko Haram in 2019 (AI April 8, 2020). IOM has around 1.6 million IDPs, around 200,000 Nigerian refugees are in neighboring countries (AA May 24, 2019a). Other sources report about two million IDPs and more than 240,000 Nigerian refugees in the neighboring states (USDOS 3/11/2020). In 2018, at least 1,200 people were killed in the conflict in the northeast, and almost 200,000 people were internally displaced (HRW January 17, 2019).

Even if the civil vigilante Civilian Joint Task Force acted quite effectively against Boko Haram in places, this group often commits human rights violations itself or arbitrarily denounces personal enemies to the security organs (AA January 16, 2020).

Swell:

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (January 16, 2020): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as of September 2019)

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (May 24, 2019a): Nigeria: Innenpolitik, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/nigeria-node/innenpolitik/205844, accessed April 17, 2020

- ACCORD - Austrian Center for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (April 17, 2020): ecoi.net topic dossier on Nigeria: Security Situation, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2028159.html, accessed April 17 .2020

- AI - Amnesty International (April 8, 2020): Amnesty Report, Nigeria, 2019, https://www.amnesty.de/informieren/amnesty-report/nigeria-nigeria-2019#section-11669032, accessed April 16, 2020

- AU-EU - African Union-EU Partnership (oD): Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/projects/multinational-joint-task-force -mnjtf-against-boko-haram, accessed April 17, 2020

- EASO - European Asylum Support Office (2.2019): Country Guidance: Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2004112/Country_Guidance_Nigeria_2019.pdf, accessed April 17, 2020

- EASO - European Asylum Support Office (11.2018a): Country of Origin Information Report - Nigeria - Security Situation, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2001366/2018_EASO_COI_Nigeria_SecuritySituation.pdf, accessed April 12, 2019

- GIZ - German Society for International Cooperation (3.2020): Nigeria - Geschichte und Staat, https://www.liportal.de/nigeria/geschichte-staat/, accessed April 9, 2020

- HRW - Human Rights Watch (January 14, 2020): World Report 2020 - Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2022679.html, accessed April 17, 2020

- HRW - Human Rigths Watch (January 17, 2019): World Report 2019 - Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2002184.html, accessed April 11, 2019

- ICG - International Crisis Group (May 16, 2019): Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing-challenge-islamic- state-west-africa-province, accessed April 17, 2020

- ÖB - Austrian Embassy Abuja (10.2019): Asylum Country Report Nigeria

- USDOS - U.S. Department of State (March 11, 2020): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2026341.html, accessed April 9, 2020

- USDOS - US Department of State (November 1, 2019): Country Report on Terrorism 2018 - Chapter 1 - Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2019164.html, accessed April 17, 2020

Legal protection / judicial system

The constitution distinguishes between federal courts, courts of the capital city district and courts of the 36 federal states (AA 16.1.2020; ÖB 10.2019). The latter have the power to set up courts of first instance by law (AA 16.1.2020). In addition, each of the 774 LGAs has its own district courts (ÖB 10.2019). Federal courts that only apply state-codified law are the Federal High Court (legislative matter of the federal government, tax, corporate and also administrative matters), the Court of Appeal (appeals matters including the State Court of Appeal and the State Sharia and Customary Court of Appeal ) and the Supreme Court (revision matters, organ complaints) (AA 16.1.2020). There are separate military courts for members of the military (USDOS 11.3.2020).

With the introduction of the expanded Sharia law in nine northern states and the predominantly Muslim parts of three other states in 2000/2001, the state Sharia courts were given criminal powers, whereas they were previously limited to Islamic civil status law (AA January 16, 2020). According to the federal constitution, since 1999 the constitution and jurisdiction of the courts with regard to the applicable legal system (“Common Law” or “Customary Law”) has been determined by the laws of the member states. Individual states have created “Sharia courts” alongside “Common Law” and “Customary Courts”. Several states, including the mixed denominational states of Benue and Plateau, have also set up Sharia appeals courts (ÖB 10.2019).

The constitution provides for the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary (AA January 16, 2020; see FH 1.2019; ÖB 10.2019; USDOS March 11, 2020). In reality, however, the judiciary is exposed to the influence of the executive and legislative branches as well as individual political leaders (AA January 16, 2020; see USDOS March 11, 2020; FH 1.2019). Politicians are trying to influence the judiciary, especially at the state and district level (LGA) (USDOS 03/11/2020). The three sometimes contradicting legal systems (ÖB 10.2019; see BS 2020) as well as the overall insufficient human and financial resources as well as insufficient training impede the functionality of the judicial system and make it chronically prone to corruption (AA 16.1.2020; see FH 1.2019; USDOS 11.3 .2020; ÖB 10.2019; BS 2020). Despite everything, the judiciary has achieved a certain degree of independence and professionalism in practice (FH 1.2019).

Arbitrary criminal prosecution or sentencing practice by the police and judiciary that discriminates according to race, nationality or the like is not discernible. However, the existing system tends to discriminate against the uneducated and poor who cannot buy themselves free from accusations, obtain bail or obtain legal counsel. In addition, many are unable to adequately safeguard their rights due to a lack of knowledge of even the most elementary basic and procedural rights (AA 16.1.2020). The law provides procedural rights such as the presumption of innocence, timely information about the charges, the right to a fair and public trial, the right to a lawyer, the right to sufficient time to prepare the defense, not to be forced to testify or to plead guilty, To question witnesses and to appeal. However, these rights are not always guaranteed (USDOS 03/11/2020). Even legally guaranteed access to legal counsel or family members is not always possible (AA January 16, 2020).

Access to government legal aid is limited in Nigeria: the Compulsory Defense Institute was only recently introduced in some states. Only in the provincial capitals do NGOs exist, some of which take on legal advice from the accused or defendants with state funding. In rural areas in particular, however, there are numerous proceedings in which the accused and accused without legal assistance remain defenseless due to a lack of knowledge of their rights (AA 16.1.2020). The right to expeditious proceedings is guaranteed by the constitution, but it is hardly guaranteed. Permanent imprisonment without charge or judgment, some of which stretch over several years, is widespread (AA January 16, 2020; see USDOS March 11, 2020).Contrary to legal requirements, pre-trial detention is often longer than the maximum expected statutory maximum sentence for the offense in question. In addition, many prisoners remain in custody even after they have served their prison sentences because their prison records cannot be found (AA January 16, 2020).

In general, the Nigerian state has taken steps to establish and operate a law enforcement system under which attacks by non-state actors are punished. It thus proves a willingness and ability to protect within a certain framework, but its effectiveness is limited by some significant weaknesses. Effective protection is sometimes not available in those areas where there is armed conflict (including parts of northeast Nigeria, the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta). There, access to protection is also partially restricted for women, members of sexual minorities and non-indigenous peoples (UKHO 3.2019).

Swell:

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (January 16, 2020): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as of September 2019)

- BS - Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020): BTI 2020 - Nigeria Country Report, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2029575/country_report_2020_NGA.pdf, accessed May 18, 2020

- FH - Freedom House (1.2019): Freedom in the World 2018 - Nigeria, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/nigeria, accessed March 20, 2019

- ÖB - Austrian Embassy Abuja (10.2019): Asylum Country Report Nigeria

- UKHO - United Kingdom Home Office (3.2019): Country Policy and Information Note - Nigeria: Actors of protection, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/794316 /CPIN_-_NGA_-_Actors_of_Protection.final_v.1.G.PDF, accessed April 29, 2020

- USDOS - U.S. Department of State (March 11, 2020): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2026341.html, accessed April 9, 2020

Sharia

With the reintroduction of Sharia criminal law at the state level in the twelve northern states with a majority Muslim population, Sharia courts of first instance also received criminal powers (e.g. imposition of corporal punishment up to death sentences such as stoning); However, this generally only applies to Muslims (AA January 16, 2020). Sharia or common law courts can only be invoked if both parties consent (ÖB 10.2019; see USDOS 21.6.2019). In the case of Sharia courts, there is an additional condition that both parties must be Muslim (ÖB 10.2019). At least one state, Zamfara, requires civil proceedings in which all parties to the litigation are Muslim to be heard in Sharia courts, with the possibility of appealing any decision to the civil court (USDOS 3/11/2020). Non-Muslims have the option to have their cases heard by the Sharia courts if they so wish (USDOS June 21, 2019). In any case, non-Muslims have the right to a procedure before a secular court (BS 2020).

The rigorous threats of punishment of the Sharia are countered by equally rigorous requirements for evidence, so that in the case of procedurally impeccable Sharia proceedings, sufficient witness evidence for a conviction is often not available. In the past, due to the complexity of the Islamic law of evidence, which was initially still new for many judges, judgments in particular in the first instance were often fraught with legal errors. Investigations and charges related to so-called Hudud criminal offenses (e.g. extramarital sex, theft, street robbery, alcohol consumption) have attracted far less public attention in recent years than in the first few years after the reintroduction of Islamic criminal law (AA 16.1.2020).

The Sharia appeals courts consistently convert stoning and amputation judgments into other penalties (USDOS 03/11/2020; see BS 2020). In 2019 there were no reports of corporal punishment (USDOS 3/11/2020). The sharia appeal ends at the level of a state appeals court, against whose judgments appeals are permissible before the (secular) federal appeals court in Abuja (AA January 16, 2020). Judgments by Sharia courts can therefore also be challenged in the formal legal system, however, the conversion of the stoning and amputation judgments is made for procedural and evidence reasons, a fundamental violation of the constitution has not yet been questioned (USDOS 03/11/2020). There are Hisbah associations to enforce Sharia law, which differ greatly between states (USCIRF 12.2019).

Swell:

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (January 16, 2020): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as of September 2019)

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (May 24, 2019): Nigeria - domestic policy, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Nigeria/innenpolitik_node.html, accessed January 31, 2020

- BS - Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020): BTI 2020 - Nigeria Country Report, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2029575/country_report_2020_NGA.pdf, accessed May 18, 2020

- ÖB - Austrian Embassy Abuja (10.2019): Asylum Country Report Nigeria

- USCIRF - US Commission on International Religious Freedom (12.2019): Shariah Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria, Implementation of Expanded Shari'ah Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes in Kano, Sokoto, and Zamfara States, 2017-2019, https: // www. ecoi.net/en/file/local/2024440/USCIRF_ShariahLawinNigeria_report_120919+v3R.pdf, accessed April 15, 2020

- USDOS - U.S. Department of State (March 11, 2020): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2026341.html, accessed April 9, 2020

- USDOS - US Department of State (June 21, 2019): 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2011098.html, accessed April 15, 2020

Security agencies

The general police and orderly tasks are incumbent on the around 360,000 strong (Federal) Police (National Police Force - NPF), which is subordinate to the General Inspector of the Police in Abuja (AA 16.1.2020). Although one of the largest police forces in the world in absolute terms, the police officer-to-population ratio is below the UN recommended number (UKHO 3.2019). The Nigerian Police, along with other federal organizations, are the primary law enforcement agency. The Department of State Service (DSS), which reports to the President via a national security advisor, is also responsible for internal security. The Nigerian Armed Forces, which are under the Ministry of Defense, are responsible for external security, but also have some responsibilities in the area of ​​internal security (USDOS 03/11/2020). Around 100,000 police officers are said to be working as security forces for public figures and influential private individuals (AA 16.1.2020). All security organs (military, state security as well as paramilitary units, the so-called Rapid Response Squads) are deployed inside the police as well as (AA 16.1.2020). The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) is responsible for all criminal offenses in connection with drugs (ÖB 10.2019).

Compared to other authorities with police powers, the NDLEA is certified to have a certain degree of professionalism. This authority is responsible for decree 33, which provides for an additional procedure for Nigerian citizens who have already been convicted of drug offenses abroad. In contrast, the NPF and the Mobile Police (MOPOL) are characterized by low professionalism, a lack of discipline, frequent arbitrariness and low eagerness to serve (ÖB 10.2019). The police are characterized by low pay, poor equipment, training and housing. The state law enforcement officers are not in a position to comprehensively control or contain violent crime in terms of personnel, technology and finance. In addition, the security forces are partly responsible for the crime themselves (AA 16.1.2020). Since the police are often unable to stop violence caused by social conflicts, the government in many cases relies on the support of the army (USDOS 03/11/2020).

The police, the DSS and the military are subordinate to civil authorities, but they operate temporarily outside of civil control (USDOS March 11, 2020). However, there were minor successes in the reorganization of parts of the military and the police (BS 2020). The government lacks effective mechanisms and sufficient political will to investigate and punish most cases of abuse by security forces and corruption within the security forces (USDOS 03/11/2020).

Swell:

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (January 16, 2020): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as of September 2019)

- BS - Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020): BTI 2020 - Nigeria Country Report, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2029575/country_report_2020_NGA.pdf, accessed May 18, 2020

- ÖB - Austrian Embassy Abuja (10.2019): Asylum Country Report Nigeria

- USDOS - U.S. Department of State (March 11, 2020): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2026341.html, accessed April 9, 2020

Vigilante groups, vigilante groups, Hisbah

Armed organizations in the form of ethnic vigilante groups have formed in various regions of the country, e.g. the Odua People’s Congress (OPC) in the southwest or the Bakassi Boys in the southeast. With these groups you can buy "security" against payment of protection money. The authorities react differently to these groups: in the state of Lagos the police took action against the OPC, in the east of the country the existence of these groups was welcomed by some governors. The police work partly with them. In general, the importance of vigilante groups in cities seems to be decreasing somewhat, but in some rural regions they still have a dominant position of power. In the fight against Boko Haram, an interethnic vigilante group - the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) - has formed under the leadership of the army in the northeast (AA January 16, 2020). The military on the ground has reportedly been coordinating closely with the CJTF, and the CJTF is receiving limited funding from the government (USDOS 3/11/2020).

Vigilante groups such as the CJTF arrest people in mass arrests, often without evidence (USDOS 03/11/2020). These groups regularly violate citizens' personal freedoms (BS 2020). In September 2017, the UN and the CJTF signed an action plan to stop the recruitment and use of children, and children have not been recruited since. Former child soldiers will be reintegrated (USDOS 11.3.2020).

In various states, the Hezbah police monitor compliance with religious regulations (AA January 16, 2020). Four states with an extended scope of Sharia law (Zamfara, Niger, Kaduna, Kano) have authorized private groups, such as the Hisbah, to enforce law and grant state subsidies for this. In certain cases these groups are authorized to make arrests. So far, their responsibility has been limited primarily to traffic offenses and market surveillance (ÖB 10.2019). Hezbah continues to arrest street beggars and prostitutes, and it confiscates and destroys alcohol (USDOS 6/21/2019). In Kano, Hezbah is run directly by the state, while in other states it is organized in a manner similar to non-state vigilante groups. The Hezbah has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, as police tasks are exclusively the responsibility of the federal government. However, it has so far not ceased its activities and has only been reorganized. According to the governor of Kano, Hezbah does not carry out any police duties, but only social and moral tasks and powers (AA January 16, 2020).

Swell:

- AA - Federal Foreign Office (January 16, 2020): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as of September 2019)

- BS - Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020): BTI 2020 - Nigeria Country Report, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2029575/country_report_2020_NGA.pdf, accessed May 18, 2020

- ÖB - Austrian Embassy Abuja (10.2019): Asylum Country Report Nigeria

- USDOS - U.S. Department of State (March 13, 2019): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2004182.html, accessed March 20, 2019

- USDOS - US Department of State (June 21, 2019): 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nigeria, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2011098.html, accessed April 15, 2020

Torture and Inhuman Treatment

The constitution and laws prohibit torture and other inhumane treatment. Since December 2017, penalties have been provided under the Anti-Torture Act. The law does not allow the use of confessions obtained under torture in trials. However, the authorities do not always respect this regulation. The Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) of 2015 prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees; however, it does not impose penalties for violations. In addition, each state has to pass ACJA-compliant laws individually, which only happened in Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Cross River, Delta, Ekiti, Enugu, Kaduna, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo and Rivers by mid-2019 (USDOS March 11, 2020 ).

The Nigerian security forces are repeatedly confronted with the accusation of committing the most serious human rights violations: According to all credible evidence, torture, arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings are still part of the repertoire of government security agencies (AA January 16, 2020; see USDOS March 11, 2020; BS 2020). The poorer sections of the population in particular have to suffer from this (AA January 16, 2020). In addition to the police, the military are also accused of using extrajudicial killings, torture and other ill-treatment, including in operations against insurgents in the northeast and against separatist movements in the southeast (FH 1.2019). Strikes with a stick are used as a punishment. In the fight against Boko Haram and ISIS-WA in the north-east of the country, anti-terrorist operations by security forces lead to human rights violations, including torture, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests (USDOS March 11, 2020; see AA January 16, 2020) and Disappearance. Some of the prisoners on remand, Shiites, Biafra activists and suspected gang criminals are also affected. Military personnel have also reportedly committed serious human rights violations in IDP camps. The government denies this (AA January 16, 2020).

In March 2016, a human rights office was set up in the Department of Civil-Military Affairs at the Army Staff. The government and military made several attempts in 2019 to investigate some incidents. The Human Rights Commission was also tasked with investigating special police units allegedly guilty of widespread human rights abuses. So far, however, all investigations have remained without legal consequences (AA January 16, 2020).

The security forces remain largely unpunished for offenses (USDOS March 11, 2020; see AA January 16, 2020). Trust in the security apparatus is underdeveloped due to repeatedly reported cases of unlawful killings, torture and inhuman treatment in police custody (ÖB 10.2019). Even the state human rights commission estimates the number of extra-legal killings at around 5,000 per year (AA January 16, 2020).

The military is repeatedly criticized by human rights organizations for extrajudicial killings, torture and other abuses, including in the context of counterinsurgency in the north-east and in operations against separatist movements in the south-east of the country (FH 1.2019).

The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) cracks down on suspects. Often there is torture or forced confessions (USDOS March 11, 2020; see GIZ 3.2020), or killings on the pretext that the prisoners wanted to flee (AA January 16, 2020). The national human rights commission is currently investigating this police unit. It has already been restructured, the effects of which cannot yet be assessed. The perpetrators act in the certainty of extensive impunity, since there are only in the rarest cases independent investigations, let alone disciplinary or even criminal consequences. When police officers are accused of being involved in extrajudicial killings, they are covered by their superiors and are often deliberately transferred to other regions to prevent the allegations from being clarified. The main victims are usually people who are suspected of a violent crime; after a confession (often obtained through torture) has been made, they are often “executed” while in police custody. It also happens again and again that security forces suddenly open fire at roadblocks they have set up, for example when someone refuses to pay a requested bribe (AA January 16, 2020).

There is no reliable knowledge about the systematic disappearance of undesirable persons by state organs. Nigerian human rights groups regularly accuse the police, in particular, of the disappearance of prisoners on remand and other people in police custody (AA January 16, 2020).According to another source, police officers and the domestic secret service arbitrarily arrest people and hold people without contact with the outside world in custody (AI April 8, 2020). The allegation of enforced disappearance is also being leveled against the Joint Task Force security forces operating in northern Nigeria. In large-scale operations, such as fighting the Islamist group Boko Haram, the police and the military often proceed with disproportionate severity (AA January 16, 2020; see AI April 8, 2020).

Torture is still widespread in police or military custody, e.g. in northeastern Nigeria and in the Niger Delta (AA January 16, 2020).

In addition, prison officials, police officers and other security forces often deny inmates food and medical treatment in order to punish them or extort money (USDOS 03/11/2020).

Despite the prohibition of torture in the constitution, there is often severe mistreatment of (arbitrarily) detainees, prisoners on remand, prison inmates and other people in the custody of the security forces. The reasons for this behavior lie on the one hand in the poorly developed human rights culture of the security forces, on the other hand in the inadequate equipment, training